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Accounting for Selectivity and Duration-Dependent
Heterogeneity When Estimating the Impact of








The impacts of international emigration and remittances on incomes and pov-
erty in sending areas are increasingly studied with household survey data. Em-
pirical analysis is needed because the effect of emigration is a priori unclear.
Households with emigrants typically benefit from remittance inflows. There
are also fewer mouths to feed among household members left behind. On the
other hand, earnings and other household inputs that emigrants would have
generated locally are lost. Since it is typically individuals of the most econom-
ically active ages who emigrate, forgone earnings and forgone own-production
may outweigh the effect of fewer mouths and more remittances, potentially
causing poverty to rise for those left behind, even if the migrants themselves
become better off.
The biggest difficulty in estimating the impacts of emigration is posed by
selectivity issues. A common research strategy in this literature is to use house-
hold survey data from the sending country to compare households where some
members have emigrated to those where no one has emigrated. Such compar-
isons are complicated by a triple- or quadruple-selectivity problem: first, house-
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holds self-select into emigration; second, in some emigrant households every-
248 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eone moves ðand thus such households are almost never included in surveys in
the sending countryÞ while other emigrant households leave some members
behind; third, some emigrants choose to return home, so their household may
ðwronglyÞ be considered as not affected by emigration. And fourth, if research-
ers wish to examine how the impact varies with duration since migration, they
also face selectivity into not just whether, but when households emigrate.
In this paper, we set out how these selectivity issues arise and their implica-
tions for existing migration studies. We then address these selectivity problems
by using new survey data designed specifically to take advantage of a random-
ized lottery that determines which applicants to the oversubscribed Samoan
Quota ðSQÞ may immigrate to New Zealand. These data allow us to compare
incomes and poverty among left-behind members in households in Samoa that
sent SQ emigrants with incomes and poverty rates of similar households that
were unsuccessful in the lottery. This random lottery solves the problem of
self-selection into migration. The SQ policy rules control who can accompany
the principal migrant, enabling us to address the second selectivity problem. Fi-
nally, our survey includes a module on return migration, allowing us to address
the third selectivity problem.Differences amongmigrants in when they win the
ballot lottery allow us to also explore duration effects and address this fourth
selectivity issue.
We find that emigration reduces poverty among remaining members in the
migrant-sending households. Although our sample is quite small for examining
duration effects, we also find suggestive evidence of duration-dependent het-
erogeneity, with the point estimates suggesting that consumption and income
fall relative to the first year effects as more time is spent abroad. This occurs
because remittances and agricultural income decline with the duration since
emigration and increases in household labor earnings with duration are not
enough to offset this. We also demonstrate that failing to control for both se-
lection into migration and selection into whether the whole household mi-
grates leads to biased estimates and incorrect inferences on the impact of emi-
gration on households left behind.
This is the first paper to use experimental data from the Samoan Quota lot-
tery. In related work, we have looked at short-run ð1 yearÞ effects of a similar
ðbut newer and smallerÞ migration program in Tonga ðMcKenzie, Gibson,
and Stillman 2007; Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 2011Þ. This paper builds
significantly on our earlier work both methodologically and substantively.
From a methodological viewpoint, this paper clearly lays out the additional
selectivity issues that the existing literature has not fully addressed and pro-
vides guidance for both experimental and nonexperimental attempts to lookThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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at the impacts of migration. Since the literature to date has not recognized all
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 249these dimensions of the selectivity problem, we believe the clear methodolog-
ical framework provided here will be of interest and value to a range of other
migration studies.
From a substantive viewpoint, the paper provides the first medium-term ex-
perimental estimates of the impact of migration—the impacts here are mea-
sured within 6 years of the eligible household members moving to New Zea-
land, and the first estimates that allow for duration-dependent heterogeneity
while addressing selectivity. There are a number of theoretical reasons why the
impact of migration on sending households is likely to vary with the duration
of migration, and there are indeed reasons to believe that not just the magni-
tude, but also the sign, of any effects may differ in the short and medium term.
Our results for Tonga are not able to examine this issue since data from there
cover only one cohort of migrants. Our findings here show that allowing for
this type of heterogeneity may be important in practice.
International migration is most prevalent and has the largest effects in small
island countries, so this paper provides new evidence of the impact of migra-
tion in a country setting where it is of first-order importance. One of the most
often discussed critiques of randomized experiments is that they are typically
not replicated in other countries, raising concerns of external validity. This pa-
per effectively doubles the set of countries for which experimental evidence on
the impacts of migration is available. The fact that we find migration reducing
poverty in Samoa contrasts with the findings in McKenzie et al. ð2007Þ that
migration increased poverty in the short run in Tonga, which we attribute to
different intrahousehold selectivity into migration in the two countries, and
potentially to more experience dealing with and preparing for migrant absence
in the Samoan case.
II. Challenges to Understanding the Impact of Migration: Triple or
Quadruple Selectivity and Duration-Dependent Heterogeneity of Impacts
There are now a sizable number of studies that aim to answer the question,
“What is the impact of engaging in international migration on household in-
comes and poverty in sending countries?” If emigration purely resulted in an
exogenous increase in income for the remaining members via remittances, the
sign of the expected impact would be trivial. However, emigration can have a
large number of other impacts on sending households. Most obviously, an ab-
sent migrant earns no domestic wage and provides no time inputs into market
and household production. While economic theory suggests via revealed pref-
erence that the net impact on a well-informed household is positive for it to
decide to migrate, it provides little guidance as to the magnitude of this effectThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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or how this gain will be distributed between the migrant and the remaining
250 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Efamily members.
Indeed our previous work on migration from Tonga has found very large
gains to the migrants themselves ðMcKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 2010Þ but
evidence that the family members left behind are, in the short run at least,
worse off when some members migrate ðGibson et al. 2011Þ. The net effect
of migration on the remaining members of sending households is therefore a
priori unclear and hence an empirical issue. However, there are several chal-
lenges to estimating this impact that the existing literature has largely ignored.
We outline these challenges here and discuss why the existing literature is un-
able to overcome them. Then, in the next section, we discuss our approach for
producing unbiased estimates of the impact of emigration.
A. Triple Selectivity
Assume for the moment that sending members abroad has a homogeneous im-
pact b on the per capita household income of the remaining household mem-
bers. The goal of many papers in the literature is to estimate this causal effect.1
The standard approach is to begin by specifying a linear regression model for
household i, relating per capita household income ðor any other related out-
come of interestÞ, Yi , to whether or not that household engages in international
migration,Mi , and a set of observed ðexogenousÞ characteristics of the house-
hold, Xi :
Yi 5 bMi 1 g
0Xi 1 εi: ð1Þ
The standard concern is that self-selection into migration leads to biased esti-
mates. In particular, one worries that there are unobserved attributes, such as
personality type, entrepreneurial ability, and ambition, that are correlated with
both the decision of the household to send migrants and the income that the
household earns. That is, we are concerned that
EðMi εiÞ ≠ 0: ð2Þ
The existing literature has focused on trying to address this first form of selec-
tivity using a variety of nonexperimental methods. This includes assuming selec-
tion on observables ðAdams 1998Þ, estimating parametric selection correction
models ðBarham and Boucher 1998; Acosta, Fajnzylber, and Lopez 2007Þ, and
using propensity-score matching ðEsquivel and Huerta-Pineda 2007Þ and in-
1 Some studies in the literature instead use receipt of remittances. This raises additional selectivity
issues in terms of which migrants send remittances and how much they send ðsee McKenzie 2005Þ, and
so we prefer to focus on the broader overall impact of migration.
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strumental variables ðIVÞmethods ðMcKenzie and Rapoport 2007; Brown and
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 251Leeves 2011Þ. However, it is easy to question the identification assumptions un-
derlying these nonexperimental approaches. A number of recent papers show
that migrants self-select in terms of both observables and unobservables ðAkee
2010; McKenzie et al. 2010Þ, in which case methods, like ordinary least squares
ðOLSÞ and matching, that assume selection on only observables produce biased
results. Similarly, selection correctionmethods in theHeckman tradition rely on
stringent functional form and distributional assumptions and dubious exclud-
ability restrictions. For example, Acosta et al. ð2007Þ and Barham and Boucher
ð1998Þ assume that household assets predict selection intomigration but do not
directly affect earnings or labor force participation. Yet, these assets could be
used to help finance business activities or themselves could be the result of labor
earnings, so they are unlikely to be a valid instrument.
Similarly, many papers using IV methods rely on current migration net-
works as an instrument, which is subject to concerns about whether there
are other excluded variables at the community level that also affect migration
and outcomes of interest. For example, a recent community weather shock,
such as a drought, may lead to both increased migration and a reduction in
agricultural income in the community, so an empirical correlation between
emigration and poverty would be a misleading estimate of emigration’s im-
pact. Historic networks are less subject to concerns about recent shocks but
still need to rely on a plausible story of why networks exogenously formed in
one location and not in another, such as the pattern of development of the
railroad system in Mexico, as used by Woodruff and Zenteno ð2007Þ and
McKenzie and Rapoport ð2007Þ.
Moreover, the selection issue raised by equation ð2Þ is only one of the three
sources of selectivity that make it difficult to estimate b. The second source is
selectivity among the households that engage in international migration as to
whether or not the whole household moves. To see how this matters, note that
we only observe the per capita income in equation ð1Þ for households in which
somemembers remain after other householdmembers emigrate. Define a selec-
tion indicator si for each household i so that si 5 1 if we observe Yi and si 5 0
if we do not due to the whole household moving. Then, rather than being
able to estimate equation ð1Þ, all we can estimate is the following equation:
siYi 5 bsi Mi 1 g
0si Xi 1 si εi: ð3Þ
Consistency of OLS estimation then requires assuming that
E siMi εið Þ 5 0 ð4ÞThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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Equation ð4Þ is again the first form of self-selection considered, this time re-
stricted to the group of households that are observed in the home country. The
additional insight here is the need for equation ð5Þ to hold. This requires that un-
observed determinants of income are uncorrelated with whether a whole house-
hold leaves or not. It is important to note that thismight not be true even if equa-
tion ð4Þ holds. In particular, even if there is no self-selection of households into
migration ðwhich is unlikelyÞ, if households self-select in terms of whether or
not the whole household moves, this will still generate biased estimates.
This formulation shows that if efforts are made to deal with the first selec-
tivity, as is common in the existing studies, the results produced are still bi-
ased if there is self-selection among which households migrate en masse and
which separate. The standard solution to account for this second form of selec-
tivity is to explicitly model the process of selection into the sample and correct
for this—either parametrically through the standard Heckman procedure or
semi-parametrically. But this requires researchers not just to come up with an
instrumental variable or convincing exclusion restriction that can be used to
explain why some households migrate and others do not but also to find a
second instrumental variable or exclusion restriction to explain which house-
holds migrate in full and which leave members behind.
This is not just a tall order, but is, in fact, impossible in most existing studies
that only use data from the sending country ðe.g., Adams 1998; Barham and
Boucher 1998; Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda 2007Þ. These studies, by defini-
tion, miss all households in which all members migrate ði.e., none are left in
the sample population of the surveyÞ. Without data on the characteristics of
these households, it is impossible to examine how they compare to those of
households with remaining members or to model this selection process. Either
policy rules that constrainmigrant eligibility or data from the destination coun-
try on whole households that move are needed to model this selectivity.2 Nev-
2 An alternative approach is provided by Yang ð2008Þ, who provides some of the most convincing
evidence on the impact of migration by using variation in exchange rate shocks experienced by
migrant-sending households in the Philippines who sendmigrants to different destinations. Implicitly,
he deals with this second selection issue by restricting the question of interest to the impact of migra-
tion on households that do not migrate en masse and then does not have to use nonmigrant house-
holds as controls, since the comparison is between different sets of partial migrant households. The
main threat to his identification strategy is then one of selectivity into destination, which he addresses
through a number of controls and sensitivity checks. This strategy is less amenable to cases where mi-
grants move only to a single country, although if there is sufficient variation in economic conditions
among destination cities, this could potentially be used as an instrument.
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ertheless, in many cases it seems likely that the whole households that move are
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 253likely to be smaller and richer than households in which some households stay
behind. Failure to eliminate such households from the comparison set of non-
migrant households will therefore bias toward finding that migration increases
household size, reduces household per capita income, and increases poverty
rates.
Finally, the third form of selectivity that raises a challenge for estimating the
impact of migration on sending households arises from return migration. The
magnitude of this effect will depend on type of migration and country con-
text. While data on return migration rates are very limited, the evidence that
does exist shows high rates of return migration in many contexts. For example,
Gibson and McKenzie ð2011Þ find among their study of top academic achiev-
ers that 38% of New Zealanders and 39% of Tongans who had ever migrated
had also returned to their origin country. Dustmann and Weiss ð2007Þ find
that 45% of immigrants into the United Kingdom from the European Union,
America, and the Middle East had remigrated within 5 years, although return
migration rates were much lower for migrants from Africa and the Indian sub-
continent. Gundel and Peters ð2008Þ find that 15% of immigrants from out-
side the EU and 40% from within had remigrated within 20 years of migrat-
ing. Return migration rates will be higher still to countries where seasonal or
temporary migration is the norm. There is evidence to suggest that return
migrants are also self-selected, with Borjas and Bratsberg ð1996Þ showing that
return migration accentuates the type of initial self-selection, so that if mi-
grants are positively selected from the origin population, return migrants are
negatively selected from among the migrant group.
How return migrants should be treated in an analysis of the impact of emi-
gration depends on what the parameter of interest is to the researcher. If the
object of interest is to estimate the impact of a household currently having a
migrant abroad, then return migrants should be classified as having Mi5 0 in
estimating equation ð3Þ. However, this has consequences for ensuring that
condition ð4Þ is satisfied. In particular, it means that researchers must come up
with an exogenous reason why some households have a migrant abroad who
has not returned while others do not. Simply modeling the decision to engage
in migration or using instruments, such as migration networks, that predict the
initial migration decision will then no longer be enough—either return migra-
tion will need to be separately modeled or instruments that explain both the
decision to migrate and the decision to stay abroad will be needed.
An alternative approach is to treat the parameter of interest as the impact of
ever having engaged in international migration. Then, households with return
migrants should be treated as having Mi 5 1 in estimating equation ð3Þ. Stud-This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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ies that focus on the direct impacts of remittances typically do not treat return
254 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Emigrant households in this way ðe.g., Adams 1998; Acosta et al. 2007; Adams,
Cuecuecha, and Page 2008Þ. However, research that recognizes the whole
host of channels through which migration affects sending households ðe.g.,
McKenzie and Rapoport 2007Þ often acknowledges that migration can con-
tinue to have impacts on households, for example, through repatriated savings
and through knowledge and skills gained abroad, and so treat return migrant
households as participating in migration. In this case, this third form of se-
lection does not present additional challenges for estimation from the first two
forms—it just requires that households with return migrants be correctly clas-
sified as migrant households.
B. Duration-Dependent Heterogeneity of Impacts
The discussion above assumes, in common with most of the literature, that
participating in international migration has a constant effect on all households.
If this assumption is violated and the impact of migration varies across house-
holds, then what is actually estimated is an average effect of some form—either
the average effect from OLS in the absence of selectivity, or the marginal aver-
age treatment effect ðMTEÞ or local average treatment effect ðLATEÞ when
methods to deal with selectivity are used. There is considerable discussion in
the treatment effects literature as to when and whether these MTE and LATE
estimates are parameters of interest for research or policy. We discuss these is-
sues in the context of our estimation later in this paper.
However, we wish to point out a more fundamental issue when it comes to
estimating the impact of migration on incomes and poverty in sending house-
holds. This is that the impact of migration on sending households is likely to
vary with the duration of migration, and there are indeed reasons to believe
that not just the magnitude, but also the sign, of any effects may differ in the
short and medium term. For example, the short-term impact of migration may
be negative as households lose the domestic income that the migrating mem-
bers normally generated and perhaps have fewer assets to work with due to the
costs of financing migration. It may take migrants some time to start paying off
their moving costs and to earn enough to start sending remittances. However,
in the medium term, this impact may be positive as the left-behind household
members adapt to their new circumstances and receive greater remittances from
migrants.
On the other hand, there is a debate in the literature as to whether remit-
tances decay—that is, as to whether the amount of remittances received falls
with duration abroad. If this is the case, then the short-run impact may be more
positive than the longer-run impact. In either case, estimating the average effectThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 255for at most some point between the short and medium terms, and it could miss
most of the impacts of migration.
As a consequence, researchers should ideally move from the simple specifi-
cation in equations ð1Þ and ð3Þ toward allowing the impact of migration to
vary with the duration abroad. For example, if we let ti be the number of years
since emigration, we might be interested in estimating:
siYi 5 bsiMi 1 l siMi  ti 1 g0si Xi 1 siεi: ð6Þ
Then the impact of having a household member abroad for ti years is b1 lti.
However, consistently estimating equation ð6Þ requires an additional assump-
tion on top of the selectivity assumptions raised previously. This requires that
there can be no selectivity in terms of how longmembers have been abroad, that
is, that
E siMiti εið Þ 5 0: ð7Þ
Return migration is one reason why such selectivity could arise. However,
even in the absence of selectivity into return migration, this assumption will be
violated if the characteristics of households that sent migrants say 2 years ago
differ from the characteristics of those households that sent migrants 5 years
ago, that is, if there is selectivity not just in whether a household engages in mi-
gration but in when it does. Business cycle effects are one reason this assump-
tion could be violated—the types of households that send migrants during a
recession may differ from the types of households that send migrants during
a boom. Researchers attempting to estimate ð6Þ therefore face a quadruple-
selectivity problem—selection into migration, selection among migrants as to
whether the whole household migrates, selection into return migration, and
selection into current duration abroad. Attempting to model these four forms
of selectivity and control for them in a nonexperimental way poses an extreme
challenge that most research designs are unlikely to be able to meet. We dis-
cuss next how the migration lottery we study allows us to address each of these
factors.
III. Using an Emigration Lottery among Samoans to Address These
Selection Issues
A. Background on Samoan Emigration
The country of Samoa consists of four inhabited islands in the South Pacific.
The population of 180,000 is predominantly rural, with two-thirds of the labor
force employed in agriculture. GDP per capita at market exchange rates is ap-This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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proximately US$2,000 ðVaai 2007Þ, similar to Guatemala, Indonesia, and
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tances are very important for Samoa. There are approximately 100,000 Samoa-
born living overseas. Slightly over 50,000 of these emigrants live in New Zea-
land, with Australia, American Samoa, and the continental United States
ðincluding HawaiiÞ being the next most important destinations, each with
approximately equal numbers.
Sizable migration from Samoa to New Zealand began during the 1960s and
1970s, with Samoans arriving on 3-month visas to take up work opportunities.
After their permits expired, many stayed in New Zealand since the return pro-
visions of the visas were not actively policed due to the excess labor demand at
the time. But in the recession that followed the first oil crisis, labor demand fell
sharply and, starting in 1974, “dawn raids”were launched to deport alleged over-
stayers. Since New Zealand had administered Samoa ðthen known as Western
SamoaÞ under League of Nations and United Nations mandates from 1920 until
1962, the citizenship status of Samoans was uncertain, and a case was taken to
the British Privy Council. In 1982, the council ruled that all Samoans born be-
tween 1924 and 1948 were British subjects and that when New Zealand citizen-
ship was created in 1949, these Samoans and their descendants had also become
New Zealand citizens. In response, the New Zealand government passed the
Citizenship ðWestern SamoaÞ Act 1982 to overturn that ruling, restricting citi-
zenship only to those already lawfully in New Zealand.
B. The Samoan Quota
However, as a compensation for this limitation on labor mobility, a “Samoan
Quota”was agreed to as part of a Treaty of Friendship. This quota allows a spec-
ified number of Samoans to be granted New Zealand permanent residence an-
nually, in addition to those entering New Zealand under normal immigration
arrangements. The quota has been set at 1,100 places per year since 2002, and
any Samoan citizen aged between 18 and 45 is eligible to register. The registra-
tion is free and many more applications are received than the quota allows, so a
random ballot is used to deal with this oversubscription.3 The number of regis-
trations varies between 5,000 and 7,000 per year. Since the quota of 1,100 ap-
plies to the total of primary applicants and the secondary migrants who are el-
igible to immigrate with them, it represents about 400 family groups. Over the
3 The random ballot was introduced in 1999. Prior to this, decisions were made on a first come, first
served basis. The ballot was drawn manually up until 2003, from which point a computer was used to
select randomly among registrations.
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last 3 years, 1,201 out of 19,326 registrations were drawn in the ballot, rep-
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 257resenting odds of about 6%.
Permanent and long-term arrivals from Samoa to New Zealand average only
2,000 per year, while settlement migrants from Samoa average 500 per year
into Australia and 200 per year into the United States over 2002–8, mostly
through family reunification policies. It is thus clear that the Samoan Quota
is a major channel for settlement emigration out of Samoa, accounting for ap-
proximately 40% of all emigration and the vast majority of emigration through
a channel other than family reunification.
Once an applicant is selected in the random ballot, they must provide evi-
dence of a job offer in New Zealand ðunskilled jobs sufficeÞwithin 6months in
order to have their application to immigrate approved. These job offers are in-
creasingly arranged by large employers visiting Samoa after the annual ballot
results are announced. Once proof of a job offer is filed along with a residence
application, it typically takes 3–9months for an applicant to receive a decision,
and they are then given up to 1 year to move. If they are successful, their im-
mediate family ðspouse and dependent children up to age 24Þ can also move to
New Zealand with them. This rule specifying which family members can and
cannot accompany the successful migrant, coupled with the random selection
among Samoan Quota applicants, is key to being able to address the selectivity
issues raised in the previous section.
Conceptually, we can estimate the impact of migration on family members
left behind by comparing outcomes for the group of households in Samoa that
sent SQ emigrants to those for the group with unsuccessful ballots who would
not be eligible to move their entire household to New Zealand had their prin-
cipal applicant been chosen in the ballot. Some households who win the lot-
tery do not end up migrating, so we use an IV approach whereby we instru-
ment whether former members of the household have migrated via the SQ
with whether any were ballot winners. We discuss this approach in more detail
in Section III.D. We next discuss the data that have been collected to allow us
to implement this estimation approach.
C. The Samoa Labor Mobility Survey
The data used in this paper are from the Samoa LaborMobility Survey ðSLMSÞ,
which was designed by the authors and implemented by the Samoa Bureau
of Statistics in late 2008. The survey is based on a self-weighting sample of
4,395 individuals from 622 households in 90 villages, drawn from all regions
of Samoa. Out of these surveyed households, 78 had current or former mem-
bers who were successful applicants to the Samoan Quota in the previousThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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258 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eleast once to the Samoan Quota in the previous 5 years and had never been
successful. The remaining 423 households in the sample did not report having
either former members who were now SQ emigrants or having current mem-
bers who had applied to the SQ in the previous 5 years. These households that
did not apply to the SQ are not good controls for the migrant households and
are therefore not used in the experimental estimates in this paper. We do use
this group to demonstrate the bias caused by ignoring selection in migration
when estimating the impact of emigration on household members left behind.
The SLMSmeasures both income and expenditure of the responding house-
holds. Five income components are considered: labor earnings; net ði.e., also
taking account of outboundÞ remittances of both money and goods over the
previous 6 months; net returns from sales of fish, crops, livestock, and hand-
icrafts; the value of own-produced or own-captured food consumed by the
household; and other income from investments, pensions, rentals, and so
forth. Household expenditures are recalled over the previous week, month,
or 6 months, depending on the particular item, and an estimate of household
consumption is formed from the sum of cash expenditures and the value of
own-produced or own-captured food consumed by the household. All of the
income and expenditure components are adjusted to an annual basis.
We use poverty standards that are based on existing poverty lines set for
Samoa from the 2002Household Income and Expenditure Survey. The higher
“basic needs” poverty line had a value of ST$37.49 per adult equivalent per
week, and 20.3% of households in Samoa had consumption expenditures be-
low this level in 2002. The food poverty line, which was the required expen-
diture just for a minimum diet providing 2,200 kilocalories per adult per day,
was calculated as ST$24.68 per week in 2002 ðwith 7.6% of households below
this lineÞ. We used the Samoa consumer price index to update these poverty
lines to October 2008 annual values of ST$2,962 and ST$1,850, which is
equivalent to US$1,007 and US$663 per adult equivalent per year.5
In addition to these two objective poverty standards, the SLMS also asked
the principal applicant in each ballot loser household and the adult aged
18–45 with the next birthday in ballot winner households about subjective
poverty, using a 10-rung Cantril ladder question: “Please imagine a 10-step lad-
4 We decided to focus onmigration from the 2003–8 ballots to limit issues in regard to the accuracy of
recalling past experiences and because we also have access to limited administrative data on SQ mi-
grants from these ballots.
5 The average exchange rate during the period of the survey was 2.94 Samoan Tala per US dollar. In
the absence of any nutritional-based adult-equivalence scales we assume that children count as 0.5 of
an adult.
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der where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people and on the
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 259highest step, the tenth, stand the richest. On which step are you today?”
D. Estimating the Impact of Migration through the Samoan Quota
The Samoan Quota enables us to address the triple- and quadruple-selectivity
issues more credibly than existing studies. Consider first the problem of esti-
mating the overall average impact of migration on household income per cap-
ita in Samoa, as in equation ð3Þ. The random selection among SQ applicants
provides a means of overcoming the first selectivity issue—that households
self-select into migration. Households self-select into whether or not a member
applies for the SQ, but among these applicants whether or not they can mi-
grate is random. The SQ policy rules provide a means for overcoming the sec-
ond source of selectivity. The rules specify which individuals can migrate with
a principal applicant—the spouse and dependent children. Thus, we restrict
the sample further to drop households in which all members would be eligible
to move to New Zealand if they had a successful ballot. This involves dropping
approximately 22% of the 121 unsuccessful ballot households in our sample,
who would move their whole household to New Zealand if they had won the
SQ lottery. Then, equation ð5Þ is satisfied for this subsample of ballot appli-
cant households where someone would remain even if a household member
was successful in the SQ lottery.
An additional potential issue could be that remaining household members
from ballot-winning households move into new households when some mem-
bers leave. This raises the concern that there are individuals in the migrant
households who would not be there if not for migration. We examine this in
Section IV.A and do not find any significant impact of migrating on household
size or of migration on the composition of individuals ineligible for migration.
But small sample sizes prevent us from ruling out this concern completely. The
concern would then be that household resources change in themigrant-sending
households due to the contributions of new household members rather than
due to the direct effects of migration on those left behind. Such a change would
still be an effect ofmigration, but just through a different channel. The available
data and qualitative work from Samoa suggest that this channel is not a large
one.
If all households that won the SQ lottery sent a migrant to New Zealand,
then equation ð4Þ would also be satisfied in this subsample. However, not all
lottery winners moved to NewZealand—somemay have changed their minds,
others may still have been in the process of moving, while others may have been
unable to find a job or failed another of the immigration requirements. In our
sample of 78 households with ballot winners, 29 households ð37%Þ did notThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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Zealand. To address this drop-out bias, we employ the standard strategy in the
experimental literature of using assignment to the treatment as an instrumental
variable for the treatment itself. In other words, our instrumental variable is a
dummy for whether a current or former household member had a successful
ballot, whereas the treatment variable is whether someone from the household
ever moved to New Zealand via the SQ. Randomization ensures that success in
the ballot is uncorrelated with unobserved individual attributes that might also
affect outcomes among the stayer household members and success in the ballot
also strongly predicts migration.
What about the third source of selectivity, arising from return migration? In
our sample, none of the 78 ballot winner households contained a member who
had migrated to New Zealand after being selected in the five previous ballots
but subsequently returned to live in Samoa. Our special module that was de-
signed to capture return migration did find two former SQ migrants in sample
households, but both had originally migrated in 2001 and hence were not in
our analysis window. Hence, we were not required to deal with the impact of
return migration in our analysis.
Restricting the sample to SQ ballot entrant households who would not all
move if a member won the lottery and using success in the lottery as an in-
strument for migration therefore enables us to consistently estimate the im-
pact of migration. If the impact varies across households, the impact we iden-
tify is a local average treatment effect ðLATEÞ, which in our case is also the
average treatment effect on the treated, since none of the households losing
the lottery can migrate through the SQ and likely do not have access to other
migration channels ðAngrist 2004Þ. Some of the recent debate about the
growing use of randomized experiments in development economics centers on
whether the LATE is a parameter of interest in many policy experiments ðe.g.,
Deaton 2010; Imbens 2010Þ. In our case of a migration lottery, we believe that
this parameter is clearly of policy interest, as it is an unbiased estimate of the
impact of migrating for a Samoan household that applies to migrate through
the migration policy being offered and does migrate if it is chosen. Thus, this
is precisely the information needed to evaluate the development impact of this
migration policy. Moreover, since the Samoan Quota is the main nonfamily
migration channel out of Samoa, it is also the effect of interest for a large share
of Samoan households with migrants.
The impact of migration is then measured for the remaining household
members of SQwinners. These individuals are typically working-age and older
adults who are either the parents or the siblings of the principal applicant, alongThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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with children who are often their nephews and nieces. Specifically, 40% of
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 261household members left behind are under 18 and are mostly nephews and
nieces of the principal applicant and spouse, 39% are working-age adults and
are mostly the siblings of the principal applicant and spouse, and the remaining
22% are older adults who are mostly the parents, aunts, and uncles of the prin-
cipal applicant and spouse. Many migration policies worldwide allow migrants
to bring their spouse and children, while making it difficult for them to bring
other family members, so these remaining members are likely to be similar to
the remaining family members seen in many other countries where permanent
emigration is common.
The final sample size for our experimental estimates is thus a sample of
166 households, consisting of households with an SQ ballot winner and those
with an SQ ballot loser who would have members remaining even if the ballot
had been successful. Although one would always like larger samples, there are
two important points to note in regard to this. First, the sample size we have
for migrants is not that different from what is often obtained in studies using
large nationally representative samples from other countries.6 Second, and
more important, the vast majority of households in large nationally represen-
tative household surveys are not similar enough to migrant households to form
a valid counterfactual.7 Thus, papers that seek to estimate the impact of migra-
tion, whether through experimental or nonexperimental methods, should be
eliminating most nonmigrant households from the analysis. In our case, the
lottery provides us a way of ensuring that we have an appropriate counterfac-
tual for our migrant households and yields a ðsmallÞ sample size that is no dif-
ferent than what one would typically obtain using nonexperimental methods
appropriately.
The initial impact of migration that we estimate is an average over house-
holds whose members have been abroad for varying amounts of time. At the
time of our survey, the sampled Samoan households with SQ emigrants in
6 For example, theMexican Family Life Survey interviewed households in 2002 and 2005. Rubalcava
et al. ð2008Þ use this to look at selection into migration by health status. Despite having a large
urban sample of 3,817 young adults in a high migration country, there are only 144 urban migrant
individuals over the 3-year period. Adams et al. ð2008Þ have a nationally representative sample of
4,000 households from Ghana, of which only 210 receive international remittances ðand certainly an
even smaller number would have sent migrants in the last 2 or 5 yearsÞ. Other specialized surveys in the
literature are often on a similar scale. For example, Barham and Boucher ð1998Þ have a total sample
of 152 households ðincluding both migrant and nonmigrant householdsÞ in their study of migration
in Nicaragua.
7 For example, in McKenzie et al. ð2010Þ we use propensity-score matching with the Tongan Labor
Force Survey and, even with a relatively small set of characteristics to match on, find that only 354 of
the 4,043 observations are in the common support.
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New Zealand had a mean ðmedianÞ time abroad for their former household
262 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Emembers of 3.4 years ð3 yearsÞ. Of the households in our sample, 37% were
interviewed 1–2 years after eligible household members had immigrated to
New Zealand, 31% were interviewed 3–4 years postmigration, and 33% were
interviewed 5–6 years postmigration. Thus, our sample covers both the short-
and medium-run impacts of migration.
As discussed above, there are theoretical reasons to suspect that the effect of
migration may vary with duration; thus we also estimate equation ð6Þ. We do
this by instrumenting the interaction between duration abroad and migrant
status with the interaction between duration abroad and ballot success. Iden-
tification of the duration effect requires overcoming the fourth selectivity dis-
cussed in Section II, that there is not selection among the timing of migration.
The Samoan Quota provides us with a plausible reason why households sent
migrants at different points in time—they just happened to have their ballot
drawn in different rounds. We would still be concerned about selectivity if the
characteristics of households applying ðand thus of those winningÞ in different
years differ significantly. Our sample sizes are too small to examine year-to-year
variation in household characteristics, but, as a simple check, we compare the
characteristics of ballot winner households with members abroad for less than
the median duration to those abroad for more than the median duration. The
results suggest that there is little selection into when individuals entered the SQ
ballot over the years considered here.
E. Verifying Randomization
We first test whether the lottery correctly randomizes households into a treat-
ment and a control group by examining whether the households containing
ballot losers are statistically different from the households containing ballot
winners ðboth the emigrant-sending households and the noncompliersÞ. As
discussed above, attention is restricted to households in which some members
would have stayed according to the age and relationship rules on which second-
ary applicants may accompany the principal applicant. Table 1 compares the ex
ante premigration characteristics available from the survey for ballot winners to
those who were unsuccessful, restricting the sample to individuals who had ap-
plied to the SQ in the previous 2 years. We restrict this test to this subset of our
sample since the survey did not collect information on whether each household
member at the time of the survey resided in the household when the SQ win-
ners emigrated in the past. Differences between ballot winners and losers from
further in the past may just reflect changes in household composition that oc-
curred after the SQ migrants emigrated and were potentially caused by this
subsequent change in household composition.This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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Of the nine characteristics we examine in this table, the only significant dif-
TABLE 1
TEST OF RANDOMIZATION
Stayer Household Characteristics ðn 5 90Þ Successful Ballot Unsuccessful Ballot
t-test
p-value
Size of the stayer household 5.8 5.2 .367
Number of adults 18–45 among stayers 2.3 2.8 .159
Number of children <18 among stayers 2.6 2.2 .446
Number of adults >45 among stayers 1.3 1.4 .435
Proportion of adults 18–45 who are female .46 .39 .267
Mean age of stayer adults 31.8 27.6 .000
Mean years of education of stayer adults 13.2 13.9 .229
Located in Apia .20 .25 .602
Located in Savai’i .20 .17 .701
Note. Subsample of households from only 2007 and 2008 ballots. Characteristics are measured 1–2 years
after randomization.
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 263ference at conventional significance levels is found for the mean age of stayer
adults, with stayer adults in successful households older than those in unsuc-
cessful households. Given the number of variables we are testing, this is con-
sistent with a joint test indicating that the characteristics of successful and un-
successful households are globally insignificantly different from each other.
F. Accounting for Multiple Entries into the Migration Lottery
An additional further complication in our context is that households could de-
cide each year whether or not to enter the SamoanQuota ballot over the 2004–
8 period. A possible concern then is that households which entered the ballot in
more years would be more likely to end up with a winning ballot and may also
differ in other dimensions from households which enter the ballot fewer times
during the 5-year period we consider. In theory, this problem is easy to fix pro-
vided one has data on which lotteries a household entered—one can then sim-
ply add dummy variables for each lottery entered as additional control variables
in equation ð1Þ, and then whether or not a household wins the lottery would be
random conditional on which lotteries they entered.8
However, although we have data on which lotteries the ballot losers and
noncompliers entered, we do not have this information for the winning ballots
who migrated. The reason for this is that we were doubtful that the families of
migrants would be able to supply accurate retrospective information on which
lotteries the migrants had entered and not won prior to their winning ballots.
We therefore must instead examine how large an issue this is likely to be and
show that our results are robust to placing additional weight on the ballot losers
who entered multiple times.
8 See Abdulkadiroglu et al. ð2011Þ for an application in the context of schooling lotteries.This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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We were able to obtain administrative data from the New Zealand Depart-
TABLE 2
ARE HOUSEHOLDS IN MULTIPLE LOTTERIES DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN ONLY ONE?
Characteristics of Unsuccessful Households
ðn 5 121Þ Applied Once
Multiple
Applications t-test p-value
Household size 7.7 7.8 .883
Number of adults 18–45 3.2 3.2 .871
Number of children <18 3.3 3.3 .897
Number of adults >45 1.1 1.2 .601
Proportion of adults 18–45 who are female .44 .50 .251
Mean age of adults 29.6 30.0 .761
Mean years of education of adults 12.4 13.1 .086
Total household income 21,934 31,968 .042
Located in Apia .27 .20 .474
Located in Savai’i .18 .08 .238
Note. Out of 121 households, 25 applied to multiple lotteries between 2004 and 2008.
264 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ement of Labor on the results of the 2005, 2006, and 2007 lotteries. Among
the ballot winners, 67% had applied only once over this 3-year period, 25%
had applied twice, and 7% had applied in all three periods. This compares to
72% of the ballot losers having applied only once over this 3-year period, 21%
having applied twice, and 6% having applied three times. So, while it is the
case that the ballot winners are more likely to have entered multiple times, the
difference is not that great, and the majority of applicants had applied only
once. This suggests that in our context accounting for multiple entry is unlikely
to make much difference unless the characteristics of those entering multiple
times differ dramatically from those who enter only once.
Next we compared the characteristics of the unsuccessful applicant house-
holds in our sample who applied to only one ballot during the 5-year period
to those of the remaining ð21%Þ unsuccessful households withmultiple ballots
ðsee table 2Þ.9 No significant differences were found in the demographic com-
position of households ðsize, age, or genderÞ or their location. However, adults
in households that applied to multiple lotteries are slightly more educated, and
these households have significantly higher incomes. Given that for the most
part the characteristics of households entering multiple ballots are either the
same or fairly similar to those entering only one ballot, there is little reason to
believe that failing to account for this affects our results qualitatively. But, as a
final check on the robustness of our results to multiple entries, we reweight our
ballot loser sample to givemore weight to the households that had enteredmul-
tiple lotteries ði.e., we reweight them from being 21% of the sample to being
9 Note that 21% of our sample had entered multiple ballots, as compared to 27% of all households in
the administrative data. This difference is not significant; thus we use the administrative proportions
in reweighting.
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33% as for winners in the administrative dataÞ. The results from this exercise
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 265are presented in appendix table A1 and show that accounting for different rates
of multiple entry among ballot winners and losers has no material impact on
any of our estimates.
IV. Experimental Estimates of the Impacts on Income and Poverty
In this section, we present experimental estimates of the impact on income and
poverty of sending household members to New Zealand under the Samoan
Quota. As discussed above, here the age and relationship rules governing which
secondary applicants can move with the principal applicant are used to identify
and drop control group households where all members would have moved to
New Zealand if they had a successful ballot. Because the exogenous covariates
we can measure for households are at the time of the interview and not at the
time the SQ migrant left the household, we do not control for any covariates
except household location ðfour regionsÞ in these regressions.
A. The Impact on Household Size and Composition
We begin in table 3 by examining the impact of emigration of some household
members on household size and composition, since one immediate effect is
that there are “fewer mouths to feed.” These results are unweighted and thus
indicate the change in household size for the average household. Emigration
leads to a significant reduction in household size. The mean household among
unsuccessful applicant households that are not entirely composed of individ-
uals who would have migrated had the ballot been won has 8.2 people, and
emigration is estimated to reduce this by 1.2 people. This is a 15% reduction
in household size. Emigration leads to households having, on average, 0.9 fewer
prime-age adults, which is a 24% decrease. There is no change in the number
of older adults ð>45 yearsÞ, which is reassuring since they are not eligible to
move as secondary applicants. The impact of the number of children is also in-
significantly different from zero but has a large standard error.
Table 3, panel B, interacts the indicator for whether a household has had
members emigrate to New Zealand with a continuous variable measuring how
long ago thesemembers first emigrated. Thus, themain effect in this table shows
the immediate impact of emigration on household size, while the interaction
term shows how this impact depends on how long ago the migrant left the
household. This panel also shows the total estimated impact on households
where individuals emigrated 1, 3, and 5 years ago. Most of the coefficients in
the specification are estimated quite imprecisely, making it difficult to say any-
thing about how the impact of migration on household size varies with the
duration of migration.This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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B. The Impact on Total Household Resources
TABLE 3









Mean for unsuccessful stayer
households 8.23 3.53 3.31 1.39
A. Estimates pooling all
households:
Impact of migration 21.24* 2.85** 2.21 2.18
ð.72Þ ð.33Þ ð.54Þ ð.19Þ
Sample size 166 166 166 166
B. Estimates allowing for
duration effects:
Impact of migration 2.51 2.60 .52 2.43
ð2.25Þ ð1.04Þ ð1.68Þ ð.61Þ
Added impact of each
year in New Zealand 2.21 2.07 2.21 .07
ð.51Þ ð.23Þ ð.38Þ ð.14Þ
Impact of 1 year in
New Zealand 2.72 2.67 .31 2.35
ð1.77Þ ð.81Þ ð1.32Þ ð.48Þ
Impact of 3 years in
New Zealand 21.14 2.82** 2.11 2.21
ð.89Þ ð.41Þ ð.66Þ ð.24Þ
Impact of 5 years in
New Zealand 21.56** 2.96*** 2.53 2.07
ð.69Þ ð.32Þ ð.52Þ ð.19Þ
Sample size 166 166 166 166
Note. These results are from instrumental variables regressions where migration is instrumented with the
SQ ballot outcome. The only control variables are indicators for the location of household in Samoa. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
266 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G ETable 4 examines the impact of emigration on household total resources and
the composition of household income. Since emigration changes household
size and demographic composition these measures are not necessarily good
proxies for individual welfare. However, they do show the ways in which house-
holds adjust their economic activities in response to emigration. Again, these
results are unweighted and thus indicate the change in total resources for the
average household.
The point estimates suggest that households which sent emigrants now have
larger total household income and consumption than households who were
unsuccessful in the lottery, but large standard errors on these estimates make
the estimates statistically insignificant. The results do show a change in the
composition of household income. Income from agricultural production andThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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income from remittances are significantly higher, by 245% and 75%, respec-
TABLE 4















stayer households 22,860 14,377 443 3,785 2,227 25,143
A. Estimates pooling
all households:
Impact of migration 1,961 21,566 1,087*** 528 1,679** 2,700
ð3,585Þ ð3,194Þ ð373Þ ð708Þ ð738Þ ð2,870Þ
Sample size 163 163 163 161 162 162
B. Estimates allowing
for duration effects:
Impact of migration 4,681 27,639 3,530*** 2,282 4,575** 6,955
ð11,329Þ ð10,141Þ ð1,280Þ ð2,255Þ ð2,303Þ ð8,849Þ
Added impact of
each year in
New Zealand 2773 1,723 2694** 2500 2831 21,218
ð2,523Þ ð2,259Þ ð286Þ ð503Þ ð514Þ ð1,982Þ
Impact of 1 year
in New Zealand 3,908 25,916 2,836*** 1,782 3,744** 5,737
ð8,918Þ ð7,981Þ ð1,007Þ ð1,774Þ ð1,813Þ ð6,962Þ
Impact of 3 years
in New Zealand 2,362 22,470 1,448*** 783 2,083** 3,300
ð4,479Þ ð4,003Þ ð504Þ ð889Þ ð914Þ ð3,513Þ
Impact of 5 years
in New Zealand 816 976 61 2216 422 863
ð3,394Þ ð3,030Þ ð390Þ ð675Þ ð706Þ ð2,763Þ
Sample size 163 163 163 161 162 162
Note. These results are from instrumental variables regressions where migration is instrumented with the
SQ ballot outcome. The only control variables are indicators for the location of household in Samoa. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 267tively, relative to unsuccessful households, while household labor earnings are
lower ðbut not significantly soÞ.
Table 4, panel B, then examines duration effects. We find that the impact of
migration on agricultural income and remittances declines with duration, al-
though the interaction term is insignificant for remittances. One explanation
for this might be that emigrants work extra hard on the gardens of their sending
families before they leave, in order to plant extra crops that can provide their
families with income and food in the first year while the migrant is away. We
have received reports of this occurring for workers participating in a new sea-
sonal worker program. The effect of this would then dissipate after the firstThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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year’s crops are harvested.10 An alternative explanation might be that the in-
268 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ecrease in remittances received in the first year is being used to purchase fertilizer
and other agricultural inputs to increase production, and then as remittances
appear to fall with duration, less of this occurs. Our survey does not allow us
to test these hypotheses.
Conversely, the results suggest that the initial negative impact of migration
on household labor earnings may decline as migrants spend more time abroad,
possibly as remaining household members adjust to the absence of the mi-
grants and/or as they adjust their labor supply in response to the declining re-
mittances and agricultural income. The point estimates suggest that this re-
sponse does not offset the decline in the other income components relative
to the initial impact as emigrants spend more time abroad. But our small sam-
ple size among the treatment group means that we cannot reject that income
and its components other than agricultural income are level over time, despite
the sizable economic significance of the point estimates.
C. The Impact on Per Person Resources
Table 5 examines the impact of emigration on per person resources. We now
weight the estimates by household size and hence the results indicate the
change in per person resources for the average individual. These results show
that left-behind household members are better off in comparison to members
of households with lottery losers. Average consumption is approximately 17%
higher in per adult-equivalent terms and income is approximately 23% higher
ðalthough neither is statistically significantÞ.11 Since the changes in income
and consumption are similar, this suggests that these changes associated with
emigration and remittances are being viewed as shocks to permanent income
by the left-behind household members. There is some weak evidence that
these gains become smaller over time, both because household size is rising
and because the income gains are declining. However, these results are also
consistent with the impacts being independent of how long the emigrants
have been gone.
10 The dominant crop for both market sales and subsistence in Samoa is taro ðColocasia esculentaÞ
which can be harvested for 6–14 months after planting.
11 Note that in common with other surveys, we do not collect data on the intrahousehold composi-
tion of consumption. One might worry that the rise in per person expenditure is the results of the
individuals who migrate being the ones who had the lowest shares of household resources. This does
not seem plausible here—the migrants are prime-age adults and their children, and resources are gen-
erally shared fairly equally within households in Samoa. Moreover, in terms of income, the principal
applicants in Samoa do not have significantly different earnings from other 18–45-year-old adults in
the same household ðwith the point estimates suggesting that if anything they earned more than non-
applicant adults in the same householdÞ.
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D. The Impact on Poverty
TABLE 5













Mean for unsuccessful stayer
households 3,533 7.93 3,983 8.15
A. Estimates pooling all
households:
Impact of migration 819 .17 977 .23
ð663Þ ð.19Þ ð607Þ ð.14Þ
Sample size 164 164 164 164
B. Estimates allowing for
duration effects:
Impact of migration 877 .27 1,507 .25
ð2,211Þ ð.64Þ ð2,016Þ ð.45Þ
Added impact of each year
in New Zealand 217 2.03 2155 2.01
ð508Þ ð.15Þ ð463Þ ð.10Þ
Impact of 1 year in
New Zealand 860 .24 1,352 .25
ð1,722Þ ð.49Þ ð1,571Þ ð.35Þ
Impact of 3 years in
New Zealand 827 .19 1,042 .23
ð816Þ ð.23Þ ð746Þ ð.17Þ
Impact of 5 years in
New Zealand 793 .13 733 .21
ð660Þ ð.19Þ ð603Þ ð.14Þ
Sample size 164 164 164 164
Note. These results are from instrumental variables regressions where migration is instrumented with the
SQ ballot outcome. The only control variables are indicators for the location of household in Samoa. Esti-
mates are variance weighted by household size. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 269Finally, table 6 examines the impact of emigration on poverty. Again, we weight
the estimates by household size and hence the results indicate the change in
poverty for the average individual. The basic needs poverty rate among individ-
uals living in households that sent Samoan Quota emigrants is 23 percentage
points lower than for households with lottery losers. Since the poverty rate
among individuals in unsuccessful households is 37%, this represents a 62%
reduction in head count poverty. However, there is no measured effect of emi-
gration on the food poverty rate that captures deeper poverty ðwith only 12%
of the lottery loser households below this lineÞ, nor is there any effect on the
poverty gap ratio at either poverty line.12 This indicates that the main impact
12 It is worth noting that given our small sample sizes, the impacts on threshold outcomes, such as
poverty rates, will be especially sensitive to where the thresholds are drawn.
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of having family members migrate to New Zealand was to lift individuals who
TABLE 6
















stayer households .37 .12 .09 .03 5.44
A. Estimates pooling all
households:
Impact of migration 2.23** 2.01 2.03 2.01 2.29
ð.11Þ ð.08Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ ð.51Þ
Sample size 166 166 166 166 161
B. Estimates allowing for
duration effects:
Impact of migration 2.32 .19 .01 .03 21.58
ð.38Þ ð.27Þ ð.14Þ ð.08Þ ð1.74Þ
Added impact of each
year in New Zealand .03 2.06 2.01 2.01 .38
ð.09Þ ð.06Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.40Þ
Impact of 1 year in
New Zealand 2.29 .13 .00 .02 21.20
ð.29Þ ð.21Þ ð.11Þ ð.06Þ ð1.35Þ
Impact of 3 years in
New Zealand 2.24* .01 2.03 2.01 2.45
ð.14Þ ð.10Þ ð.05Þ ð.03Þ ð.64Þ
Impact of 5 years in
New Zealand 2.19 2.11 2.06 2.03 .31
ð.11Þ ð.08Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ ð.52Þ
Sample size 166 166 166 166 161
Note. These results are from instrumental variables regressions where migration is instrumented with the
SQ ballot outcome. The only control variables are indicators for the location of household in Samoa. Esti-
mates are variance weighted by household size. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
270 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Ewere just below the basic needs poverty line out of poverty, with insignificant
effects on the much smaller proportion of individuals who were poorer than
this. The impact on the subjective poverty reported by an individual adult
respondent in each household is negative but also statistically insignificant.
Again, there is someweak evidence that any possible poverty reduction declines
over time, but the years since migration term is neither significant nor the same
sign across different poverty measures.
V. The Importance of Different Sources of Selection Bias
In this section, we examine how our experimental estimates compare to esti-
mates that do not control for self-selection by households into emigration and
the selection among emigrant households into those whether everyone movesThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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versus households that leave some members behind. This allows us to judge
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 271how large an effect these two forms of selection bias have on estimates of the
impact on income and poverty of sending householdmembers toNewZealand
under the Samoan Quota. It is worth noting that both the direction and size of
these two forms of selection bias are particular to the context of the Samoan
Quota and may not be indicative of what would be found when examining the
impact of emigration in other contexts.
A. Households with Left-Behind Members versus All-Move Households
We begin by examining the bias that results from failing to exclude unsuccess-
ful households in which all members would move if the household had been
successful in the migration lottery.We do this by reestimating the experimental
regressionmodels but including these “all-move” households as part of the con-
trol group. This replicates the situation in which a researcher has a convincing
empirical strategy for controlling for self-selection into emigration but is un-
able to either identify which nonemigrant households would emigrate enmasse
or to model this selection process.
Table 7 presents the results from this exercise along with the original exper-
imental estimates previously presented in panel A of tables 3–6. Because of the
structure of the SQ policy rules, whole households that move are smaller than
stayer households. Hence, failing to drop all-move ballot losers causes us to un-
derstate the fall in household size frommigration. In this particular setting, this
is the main bias that occurs from failing to control for this source of selection
bias. On the other hand, failing to remove all-move households has no impact
on our estimates of the impact of emigration on household income. This in-
dicates that while all-move households have fewer members than the other
households with lottery losers, they have similar levels of income. Hence, when
examining household income, wrongly including the all-move households in
the control group does not have a qualitative impact on the results. Turning
to the remaining estimates, there is suggestive evidence that including all-move
households leads to a downward bias in the estimated impact of emigration on
per capita consumption and poverty rates, but none of these differences are es-
timated with enough precision to rule out the estimates being unaffected by
this form of selection bias.
B. Selection into Emigration
We next examine the bias that results from failing to control for any source of
selection on unobservables, either into emigration or among emigrant house-
holds, of whether to migrate en masse. Comparing these results to those in the
previous section gives an indication of the importance of selection ðon un-This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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TABLE 7

















Total household size 21.24* 2.75 2.12 .29
ð.72Þ ð.72Þ ð.50Þ ð.28Þ
Adults aged 18–45 2.85** 2.53 .11 .2
ð.33Þ ð.34Þ ð.22Þ ð.13Þ
Children aged under 18 2.21 2.27 2.55 2.13
ð.54Þ ð.53Þ ð.36Þ ð.19Þ
Adults aged over 45 2.18 .06 .33*** .25***
ð.19Þ ð.21Þ ð.13Þ ð.07Þ
Total income 1,961 3,395 23,278 364
ð3,585Þ ð3,599Þ ð2,284Þ ð1,372Þ
Household labor earnings 21,566 2762 25,005** 23,275***
ð3,194Þ ð3,149Þ ð1,963Þ ð887Þ
Agricultural income 1,088*** 1,097*** 57 159
ð373Þ ð356Þ ð246Þ ð468Þ
Subsistence income 528 955 286 756***
ð708Þ ð682Þ ð462Þ ð244Þ
Net remittances 1,679** 1,982*** 1,681*** 2,733***
ð738Þ ð714Þ ð477Þ ð382Þ
Total consumption 2,701 2,239 2822 446
ð2,870Þ ð2,884Þ ð1,916Þ ð948Þ
Income per adult equivalent 819 888 2622 2133
ð663Þ ð665Þ ð410Þ ð273Þ
Log income per adult equivalent .17 .18 2.14 .08
ð.19Þ ð.19Þ ð.12Þ ð.07Þ
Consumption per adult equivalent 977 529 2159 278
ð607Þ ð616Þ ð364Þ ð202Þ
Log consumption per
adult equivalent .23 .14 2.02 .06
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ ð.08Þ ð.05Þ
Poverty head count, basic needs line 2.23** 2.20* .002 2.04
ð.11Þ ð.11Þ ð.07Þ ð.04Þ
Poverty head count, food poverty line 2.01 2.01 2.02 2.06**
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.05Þ ð.03Þ
Poverty gap, basic needs line 2.03 2.03 2.003 2.04**
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ
Poverty gap, food poverty line 2.011 2.006 2.004 2.03***
ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.01Þ
Subjective poverty ladder 2.29 2.43 .28 2.07
ð.51Þ ð.50Þ ð.32Þ ð.18Þ
Sample size 166 199 199 615
Note. The first column repeats the complete results from panel A in tables 3–6. The second column pre-
sents the results when these models are reestimated with all-move ballot loser households also included in
the sample. The third and forth columns present results from estimating OLS models with controls for the
number of children, prime-age adults, and older adults in the households ðexcept when household size is
the outcome being examinedÞ, the percentage of adults in the household that are female, the average age
of adults in the household, the highest educational attainment of adults in the household, household
wealth, and the location of the household in Samoa. Here emigrant households are defined as any that re-
ceive international remittances from former family members. In the fourth column, SQ nonapplicant house-
holds are added to the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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observablesÞ into emigration on its own. Here emigrant households are defined
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 273as those receiving international remittances from former family members. This
is the approach used to identify emigrant households in much of the literature
since household surveys rarely ask about the current location of previous house-
hold members ðe.g., Adams 1998; Acosta et al. 2007; Adams et al. 2008Þ.13 Ap-
pendix table A2 compares characteristics of the ballot loser households to
households that did not apply for the Samoan Quota ballot ðcol. 2Þ, to the sub-
set of nonapplicant households that have an emigrant abroad ðcol. 3Þ and to
households who were successful in the ballot but failed to move ði.e., noncom-
pliers, col. 4Þ. We also compare the subset of unsuccessful ballots that have an
emigrant abroad as measured by remittance receipt to ones that do not ðcols. 5
and 6Þ.
There is clear evidence of positive selection into applying for the lottery:
households that apply are more likely to be located in Apia ðthe capitalÞ, have
higher education among adults, greater wealth, and larger household sizes.
However, among ballot winners, there appears to be negative selection into mi-
gration—as seen by the fact that the noncompliers have significantly higher
wealth than unsuccessful households and ðinsignificantlyÞ higher education.
Among unsuccessful ballots, those receiving remittances from former mem-
bers, who are hence misclassified as emigrant households in these regressions,
appear to be negatively selected, although again the evidence is quite weak in
terms of statistically significant differences.
We then estimate OLS regression models ði.e., eq. ½1 aboveÞ of the rela-
tionship between being an emigrant household and outcomes controlling for
the number of children, prime-age adults, and older adults in the households
ðexcept when the regression outcome is household sizeÞ, the percentage of
adults in the household that are female, the average age of adults in the house-
hold, the highest educational attainment of adults in the household, house-
hold wealth, and the location of the household in Samoa.
The results from these models are presented in the third and fourth columns
of table 7. Column 3 retains the same sample as column 2 but uses OLS rather
than the experimental IV. This shows the effect of failing to control for selec-
tive migration among ballot winners as well as the effect of classifying house-
holds based on remittance receipt as opposed to a tightly defined criterion.
Column 4 then uses the full sample of households, which induces additional
bias by including as comparators households in which no one has applied to
migrate.
13 Seventy-one percent of unsuccessful ballot households receive remittances from former members
versus 76% of SQ migrant households; hence this change in classification potentially has important
impacts on the results.
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Compared to column 2, we can see that failing to control for both forms of
274 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Eselection into emigration has larger effects on our results than failing to control
for selection into en masse emigration. Both selection into migration among
the ballot winners and selection into applying for the Samoan Quota matter.
First, examining the impact on household size, selection into migration further
exacerbates the downward bias caused by failing to exclude all-move house-
holds—consistent with the applicant households having larger household size
than the nonapplicant households in appendix table A2. Using the specifica-
tions in columns 3 and 4, we would ðincorrectlyÞ find that emigration has no
impact on household size and leads to an increase in the number of older adults
in the household.
Failing to control for selection into migration also has large effects of our
estimates of the impact on household income. Using these specifications we
would find that emigration leads to a large decline in household labor earnings,
no increase in agriculture income, but a larger increase in remittances. Com-
bining these various impacts, we would now find emigration to have no impact
on total household income, as well as no impact on per capita income and con-
sumption, and a much smaller impact on basic needs household poverty.
Again, there is a lack of precision in many of these estimates, but overall the
results strongly suggest that failing to control for self-section into emigration
leads to a downward bias in the estimated impact of emigration on household
income and a corresponding upward bias on the estimated impact on house-
hold poverty. Based on the evidence in appendix table A2, this bias is likely
caused by negative selection into migration among successful ballots and into
remittance receipt among unsuccessful ballots. For unsuccessful ballots, this is
consistent with extended family members targeting remittances toward less
well-off households or those that have experienced negative shocks, such as
crop failures. It is uncertain to the cause of positive selection among noncom-
pliers, but given that 11 out of 29 households in this group are in the process of
moving to New Zealand, one possible explanation is that wealthier households
find the moving process more time consuming ðe.g., they may have more live-
stock to sellÞ. While these findings are particular to the context examined in
this paper, the results strongly suggest that the traditional approaches used in
the previous literature examining the impact of migration on sending house-
holds are likely to produce biased results.
VI. Conclusions
The main difficulty in estimating the impacts of emigration on household
members left behind is posed by selectivity issues. A common research strategy
in this literature is to use household survey data to compare outcomes forThis content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
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households in which some members have emigrated to outcomes for those
Gibson, McKenzie, and Stillman 275where all members are currently in the sending country. Such comparisons are
complicated by a triple-selectivity problem: first, households self-select into
emigration; second, in some emigrant households everyone moves ðand thus
such households are almost never included in survey data on the sending
countryÞ; third, some emigrants choose to return home, so their household
may ðwronglyÞ be considered as not being affected by emigration.
In this paper, we show how these selection problems invalidate the existing
approaches used in most of the previous literature. Going forward, we recom-
mend that nonexperimental studies model or instrument both selection into
migration and selection as to which members migrate, and that where possible,
they treat households with return migrants as still being affected by migration.
In order to model the second form of selectivity, future studies will need to pay
more attention to the policy rules and household behaviors that lead some
households to send only some of their members abroad and other households
to migrate en masse. In the absence of detailed institutional knowledge of pol-
icy rules that determine who can move, it will be important to use data on
whole households that move ðfrom destination country surveysÞ to determine
which nonmigrant households should be dropped when comparisons are being
made to households in the sending country with a migrant abroad.
Here we have addressed these selectivity problems by using survey data de-
signed specifically to take advantage of a randomized lottery that determines
which applicants to the oversubscribed Samoan Quota may immigrate to New
Zealand. We find that migration reduced basic needs poverty among former
household members. This contrasts with the short-term impact of migration
for Tongans moving to New Zealand through a similar lottery program—in
McKenzie et al. ð2007Þ we find an increase in poverty for those left behind.
Comparing the results, the difference stems from a much larger fall in house-
hold labor earnings in Tonga than in Samoa, and a fall in agricultural produc-
tion in Tonga compared to a rise in agricultural income in Samoa. The increase
in remittances is similar in both cases.
In Tonga, we found that the movers earned twice the weekly income as the
stayers within a potential migrant household ðGibson et al. 2011Þ, which was
why household earnings declined so drastically when these individuals mi-
grated. In contrast, fortnightly earnings for stayer 18–45-year-old adults in
Samoa average 179 Tala, versus 211 Tala for the movers ð p 5 .32Þ.14 Thus,
14 This is based on analysis of earnings of potential movers and potential stayers in the ballot loser
households containing both Samoan Quota applicants and individuals who would stay in Samoa had
these applicants won the ballot.
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Samoan households rely relatively less on the labor earnings of the potential
276 E C O N O M I C D E V E L O P M E N T A N D C U L T U R A L C H A N G Emigrants before migration and so suffer less opportunity cost of their absence
in terms of these forgone labor earnings. It is also possible that the much longer
history of migration through the SQ has given households more time to learn
how to adjust to the absence of members, potentially through getting them to
set up a lot of agricultural production beforehand. These differences highlight
the importance of context in understanding the impacts of migration and of
replicating these experimental studies in more locations where possible.
Finally, in addition to forming experimental estimates of the average impact
of migration on left-behind household members, we estimated models that al-
low for duration-dependent heterogeneity in these impacts. While our sample
size is small for precise estimation of such effects, we do find suggestive evi-
dence that allowing for this type of heterogeneity may be important in practice.
Our point estimates suggest that income among sending households de-
cays as SQ migrants spend longer in New Zealand, with agricultural income
and remittances declining with duration. While these results are only sugges-
tive, they do point to a need for other studies with larger samples to seriously
consider and model these duration effects rather than assuming a homoge-
neous impact of migration with time spent abroad.This content downloaded from 130.217.227.3 on Sun, 23 Jun 2013 16:49:35 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Appendix
TABLE A1ROBUSTNESS TO REWEIGHTING FOR MULTIPLE LOTTERY ENTRY
Unadjusted Reweighted
Total household size 21.24* 21.15plete results from
reestimated with
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2.82**Adults aged 18–45ð.33Þ ð.33Þ
Children aged under 18 2.21 2.15ð.54Þ ð.53Þ
Adults aged over 45 2.18 2.18ð.19Þ ð.20Þ
Total income 1,961 1,505ð3,585Þ ð3,751Þ
Household labor earnings 21,566 21,178ð3,194Þ ð3,223Þ
Agricultural income 1,087*** 1,073**ð373Þ ð419Þ
Subsistence income 528 329ð708Þ ð724Þ
Net remittances 1,679** 1,508*ð738Þ ð784Þ
Total consumption 2,700 2,537ð2,870Þ ð2,931Þ
Income per adult equivalent 819 718ð663Þ ð695Þ
Log income per adult equivalent .17 .13ð.19Þ ð.20Þ
Consumption per adult equivalent 977 846ð607Þ ð661Þ
Log consumption per adult equivalent .23 .20ð.14Þ ð.15Þ
Poverty head count, basic needs line 2.23** 2.20ð.11Þ ð.12Þ
Poverty head count, food poverty line 2.01 2.02ð.08Þ ð.10Þ
Poverty gap, basic needs line 2.03 2.03ð.04Þ ð.05Þ
Poverty gap, food poverty line 2.01 2.01ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
Subjective poverty ladder 2.29 2.37ð.51Þ ð.53Þ
panel A in table column pre-Note. The first column repeats the com
sents the results when these models are ballot loser ho ered multiple
ballots given the sameweight as the prop households who ballots. Stan-ortion of winning enteredmultiple
dard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
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